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Abstract. We present a novel progress-sensitive, ﬂow-sensitive hybrid
information-ﬂow control monitor for an imperative interactive language.
Progress-sensitive information-ﬂow control is a strong information secu-
rity guarantee which ensures that a program's progress (or lack of) does
not leak information. Flow-sensitivity means that this strong security
guarantee is enforced fairly precisely: we track information ﬂow accord-
ing to the source of information and not to an a priori given variable
security level. We illustrate our approach on an imperative interactive
language. Our hybrid monitor is inlined: source programs are translated,
by a type-based analysis, into a target language that supports dynamic
security levels. A key beneﬁt of this is that the resulting monitored pro-
gram is amenable to standard optimization techniques such as partial
evaluation.
1 Introduction
Information-ﬂow control is a promising approach to enable trusted systems to in-
teract with untrusted parties, providing ﬁne-grained application-speciﬁc control
of conﬁdential and untrusted information. Static mechanisms for information-
ﬂow control (such as security type systems [12,14]) analyse a program before
execution to determine whether its execution satisﬁes the information ﬂow re-
quirements. This has low runtime overhead, but can generate many false posi-
tives. Dynamic mechanisms (e.g., [4]) accept or reject individual executions at
runtime and thus can incur signiﬁcant runtime overheads. Hybrid information-
ﬂow control techniques (e.g., [8]) combine static and dynamic program analysis
and strive to achieve the beneﬁts of both: precise (i.e., per-execution) enforce-
ment of security and low runtime overhead.
We present a novel progress-sensitive [2], ﬂow-sensitive hybrid information-
ﬂow control monitor for an imperative interactive language. Our monitor pre-
vents leaks of conﬁdential information, notably via progress channels, while
limiting over approximation, thanks to ﬂow sensitivity and its inline nature.
Our monitor is inlined: source programs are translated into a target language
that supports dynamic security levels [15]. The type-based translation inserts
commands to track the security levels of program variables and contexts, and to
control information ﬂow. A key beneﬁt is that the resulting monitored program
is amenable to standard optimization techniques such as partial evaluation [7].
The translation to the target language performs a static analysis using three
security levels: L (for low-security information), H (for high-security informa-
tion), and U (for unknown information). If the program is statically determined
to be insecure, then it is rejected. Otherwise, the translation of the program dy-
namically tracks the unknown security levels, and ensures that no leak occurs.
Our main contributions are twofold. This work is one of the ﬁrst hybrid mon-
itor that enforces both ﬂow and progress-sensitive information security; more-
over, the combination of channel-valued variables, ﬂow-sensitivity and progress-
sensitivity presents a couple of issues that we solve.
Motivating examples
Channel variables Our source language supports channel variables whose securi-
ty level can be statically unknown. This leads to use a special security level,
U , which delays the decision to accept or reject certain programs to runtime.
Indeed, a channel level needs upward or downward approximation according to
its use and this cannot be approximated, as the following example shows.
i f lowValue > 0
then d := lowChannel
else d := highChannel end;
(* Case 1 *) (* Case 2 *)
send highValue to d x := read d;
(*to be rejected if d is L*) send x to lowChannel
(*to be rejected if d is H*)
Listing 1.1: We cannot be pessimistic about channel variables
Progress channels The progress of a program, observable through its outputs,
can reveal information. In the following program, the occurrence of an output
on the public channel reveals a conﬁdential information controlling the loop
termination.
while highValue > 0
do skip end;
send 42 to lowChannel
Listing 1.2: Progress leak
The most common way to prevent leaks through progress channels is to forbid
loops whose execution depends on conﬁdential information [10,13], but it leads
to the rejection of many secure programs, such as the following.
while highValue > 0 do
highValue := highValue - 1 end;
send 42 to lowChannel
Listing 1.3: Loop that always terminates
Inspired by Moore et al., [9], we use an oracle to determine the termination
behaviour of loops. If it tells that a loop always terminates (cf Listing 1.3),
then there is no possible leak of information. If the oracle says it may diverge,
then a risk of information leak is ﬂagged. The oracle is a parameter based on
termination analysis methods brought from the literature ([6]).
Structure In Section 2, we present the imperative language used to illus-
trate our approach. Section 3 deﬁnes the non-interference property. Section 4
describes our typed-based instrumentation mechanism, explains the type sys-
tem, and presents the target language in which the instrumented programs are
written; it is an extension of the source language with dynamic security levels.
Section 5 is a summary of related work. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Source language
Source programs are written in a simple imperative language. We suppose that
the interaction of a program with its environment is done through channels.
Channels can be, for example, ﬁles, users, network channels, keyboards, etc.
These channel constants are associated to a priori security levels, private or
public. This is more realistic than requiring someone to manually deﬁne the level
of every variable of the program; their level can instead be inferred according to
the sources of information they may hold.
2.1 Syntax
Let V be a set of identiﬁers for variables, and C a set of predeﬁned communica-
tion channels. The syntax is as follows.
(variables) x ∈ V ∪C
(integer constants) n ∈ Z
(expressions) e ::= x | n | e1 op e2 | read x
(commands) cmd ::= skip | x := e | if e then cmd1 else cmd2 end |
while e do cmd end | cmd1; cmd2 | send x1 to x2
Values are integers (we use zero for false and nonzero for true), or channel names.
Symbol op stands for arithmetic or logic binary operators. We write Exp for the
set of expressions. W.l.o.g., we assume each channel consists of one value, which
can be read or modiﬁed through read operation and send command respec-
tively. It is easy to generalize to channels consisting in sequences of values.
2.2 Semantics
A memory m : V unionmulti C → Z unionmulti C is a partial map from variables and channels to
values, where the value of a channel is the last value sent to this channel. More
precisely a memory is the disjoint union of two maps of the following form:
mv : V → Z unionmulti C, mc : C → Z,
where unionmulti stands for the disjoint union operator. We omit the subscript when-
ever the context is clear. We write m(e) = r to indicate that the evaluation of
expression e under memory m returns r.
The semantics of the source language is mostly standard and is illustrated in
Fig. 1. Program conﬁgurations are tuples 〈cmd ,m, o〉 where cmd is the command
to be evaluated, m is the current memory and o is the current output trace. A
transition between two conﬁgurations is denoted by the −→ symbol. We write
−→∗ for the reﬂexive transitive closure of the −→ relation.
We write v ::vs for sequences where v is the ﬁrst element of the sequence, and
vs is the rest of the sequence. We write  for the empty sequence. An output trace
is a sequence of output events: it is of the form o = (v0, ch0) :: (v1, ch1) :: . . .
where vk ∈ Z is an integer value, and chk is a channel, k ∈ N. The rule for
sending a value appends a new output event to the end of the trace. (We abuse
notation and write o :: (v, ch) to indicate event (v, ch) appended to trace o.)
(Skip)
〈skip,m, o〉−→〈stop,m, o〉 (Assign)
m(e) = r
〈x := e,m, o〉−→〈stop,m[x 7→ r], o〉
(Send)
m(x1) = v ∈ Z m(x2) = ch ∈ C
〈send x1 to x2,m, o〉−→〈stop,m[ch 7→v], o :: (v, ch))〉
(Seq1)
〈cmd1,m, o〉−→〈stop,m′, o′〉
〈cmd1; cmd2,m, o〉−→〈cmd2,m′, o′〉
(Seq2)
〈cmd1,m, o〉−→〈cmd ′1,m′, o′〉 cmd ′1 6= stop
〈cmd1; cmd2,m, o〉−→〈cmd ′1; cmd2,m′, o′〉
(If)
m(e) 6= 0 =⇒ i = 1 m(e) = 0 =⇒ i = 2
〈if e then cmd1 else cmd2 end,m, o〉−→〈cmd i,m, o〉
(Loop1)
m(e) 6= 0
〈while edo cmd end,m, o〉−→〈cmd ;while edo cmd end,m, o〉
(Loop2)
m(e) = 0
〈while e do cmd end,m, o〉−→〈stop,m, o〉
Fig. 1: Semantics of the source language
We write 〈cmd ,m, 〉 ↓ o if execution of conﬁguration 〈cmd ,m, 〉 can produce
trace o, where o may be ﬁnite or inﬁnite. For ﬁnite o, 〈cmd ,m, 〉 ↓ o holds if
there is a conﬁguration 〈cmd ′,m′, o〉 such that 〈cmd ,m, 〉 −→∗ 〈cmd ′,m′, o〉.
For inﬁnite o, 〈cmd ,m, 〉 ↓ o holds if for all traces o′ such that o′ is a ﬁnite
preﬁx of o, we have 〈cmd ,m, 〉 ↓ o′.
3 Security
We deﬁne an execution as secure if the outputs on public channels do not reveal
any information about the inputs of private channels. This is a standard form of
non-interference (e.g., [12,14]) adapted to our particular language model. More
formally, we require that any two executions of the programs starting from initial
memories that have the same public channel inputs, produce the same publicly
observable outputs. This means that an observer of the public output could
not distinguish the two executions, and thus learns nothing about the inputs of
private channels.
Before formally deﬁning non-interference, we ﬁrst introduce some helpful
technical concepts. We assume a lattice of security levels (L,v) with two ele-
ments: L (Low) for public information and H (High) for private information,
ordered as L v H. The projection of trace o to security level `, written o`, is
its restriction to output events whose channels' security levels are less than or
equal to `. Formally,
` = 
((v, ch) ::o)` =
{
(v, ch) :: (o`) if levelOfChan(ch) v `
o` otherwise
where levelOfChan(ch) denotes the security level of channel ch (typically spec-
iﬁed by the administrator).
We say that two memories m and m′ diﬀer only on private channel inputs if
mv = m
′
v and
∀ch ∈ C.levelOfChan(ch) = L⇒ mc(ch) = m′c(ch).
Deﬁnition 1 (Progress-sensitive non-interference).
We say that a program p satisﬁes progress-sensitive non-interference if for
any two memories m and m′ that agree on public variables and public channel
inputs, and for any (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) trace o such that 〈p,m, 〉 ↓ o, then there
is some trace o′, such that 〈p,m′, 〉 ↓ o′ and oL = o′ L.
This deﬁnition of non-interference is progress-sensitive in that it assumes that
an observer can distinguish an execution that will not produce any additional
observable output (due to termination or divergence) from an execution that will
make progress and produce additional observable output. Progress-insensitive
deﬁnitions of non-interference typically weaken the requirement that oL = o′ L
to instead require that oL is a preﬁx of o′ L, or vice versa.
4 Type-based Instrumentation
We enforce non-interference by translating source programs to a target language
that enables the program to track the security levels of its variables. The trans-
lation performs a type-based static analysis of the source program, and rejects
programs that clearly leak information (i.e. the translation fails).
In this section, we ﬁrst present the security types for the source language
(in order to provide intuition for the type-directed translation) followed by the
description of the target language, which extends the source language with run-
time representation of security levels. We then present the translation from the
source language to the target language.
4.1 Source language types
Source language types are deﬁned according to the following grammar. The
security types are deﬁned as follows:
(security levels, L) ` ::= L | U | H
(value types, ValT ) σ ::= int | int` chan
(variable types, VarT ) τ ::= σ`
Security levels in types include L and H, and also U (Unknown), which is
used to represent a statically unknown security level. The translated program will
explicitly track these statically unknown security levels at runtime. The security
levels are organized in a lattice (L,v), where L = {L,U,H} and L v U v H,
(H 6v U 6v L). The associated supremum is denoted unionsq. We derive two order
relations that allow us to deal with the uncertainty level.
Deﬁnition 2. The relations vs, surely less than, and vm, maybe less than, are
deﬁned as follows
`1 vs `2 if (`1 v `2) ∧ ¬(`1 = `2 = U)
`1 vm `2 if (`1 v `2 ∨ `1 = U ∨ `2 = U)
Intuitively, we have ` vs `′ when we can be sure statically that ` v `′ will be
true at runtime, and we have ` vm `′ when it is possible that ` v `′ at runtime.
For example, U 6vs L but U vm L.
Value types are the types of integers (int) and channels. Type int` chan is
the type of a channel whose values are of security level `.
Variables types associate a security level with a value type. Intuitively, σ`
represents the type of a variable whose value type is σ, and whose variable type
is `, the latter is an upper bound of the information level inﬂuencing the value.
We instrument source programs to track at runtime the security levels that
are statically unknown. That is, if a variable x has type σU for some value type
σ, then the instrumented program will have a variable that explicitly tracks
the security level of variable x. Moreover, if σ is the unknown channel type
(intU chan) then the instrumented program will have a variable that explicitly
tracks the security level of the channel that is assigned to x. In order to track
these security levels, our target language allows their runtime representation.
The uncertain level As illustrated in Listing 1.1, a channel level needs up-
ward or downward approximation according to its use. This is the main reason
underlying the use of the uncertainty level U . After the conditionals of that
listing, d has type (intUchan)L because it contains either a low or high channel
and its value is assigned in a context of level L. Our typing system accepts this
program in both Case 1 and Case 2, but inserts runtime checks. If the condi-
tion lowValue > 0 is false at runtime, then sending of a highValue on d would
be safe, and Case 1 should be accepted, while Case 2 should be rejected since
it attempts to send a high level value to a public channel. On the contrary, if
lowValue > 0 appears to be false at runtime, then Case 1 should be accepted
and Case 2 rejected.
The uncertainty is unavoidable in the presence of ﬂow sensitivity and channel
variables. Indeed, we point out that we cannot be pessimistic about the level
of variable channels in this program. The output command suggests that a safe
(yet too strong) approximation for d would be a low security level. Yet, the input
command suggests that a safe (yet too strong) approximation for d would be a
high security level, which contradicts the previous observation. Consequently, if
we are to accept the program in Listing 1.1, in both cases, we need an alternative
security type, U , to carry on with the analysis.
4.2 Syntax and semantics of target language
Our target language is inspired by the work of Zheng and Myers [15], which
introduced a language with ﬁrst-class security levels, and a type system that
soundly enforces non-interference in this language. The syntax of our target
language is deﬁned as follows. The main diﬀerence with the source language is
that it adds support for level variables (regrouped in the set Vlevel), a runtime
representation of security levels.
(variables) x ∈ V ∪C
(level variables) x˜ ∈ Vlevel
(integer constants) n ∈ Z
(basic levels) k ::= L | H
(level expressions) ` ::= k | x˜ | ` | `1 unionsq `2 | `1 u `2
(integer expressions) exp ::= x | n | exp1 op exp2 | readx
(expressions) e ::= exp | `
(commands) cmd ::= skip | (x1, . . . , xn) := (e1, . . . , en) |
if e then cmd1 else cmd2 end | cmd1; cmd2 |
while e do cmd end | send x1 to x2 |
if `1 v `2 then (sendx1 tox2) else fail end
Dynamic types will allow a veriﬁcation of types at runtime: this is the goal
of the new send command, nested in a conditional  call it a guarded send 
that permits to check some conditions on security levels before sending a given
variable to a channel. If the check fails, the program aborts. In the target lan-
guage, only security levels L and H are represented at runtime. The security
level U used in the source language typing is replaced by variables and expres-
sions on variables. Level expressions support operators for supremum, inﬁmum
and complement (where L = H and H = L); these are deﬁned in Section 4.3.
For simplicity, we assume that security levels can be stored only in a re-
stricted set of variables Vlevel ⊆ V. Thus, the variable part mv of a memory m
now has the following type mv : (Vlevel → {L,H}) unionmulti (V \ Vlevel → Z unionmulti C). Fur-
thermore we assume that Vlevel contains variables _pc and _hc, and, for each
variable x ∈ V \ Vlevel there exist level variables xlev; for channel variables, we
also have a level variable for their content, that is, the level of the informa-
tion stored in the channel that the variables point to, written xch. They will be
used in instrumented programs to track security levels. For example, if x is a
channel variable of security type (int` chan)`′ , then the values of these variables
should be xch = ` and xlev = `
′ (this will be ensured by our instrumentation).
Variables _pc and _hc hold the security levels of the context and halting con-
text respectively. What these are will be explained in Section 4.3. Note that the
simultaneous assignment (x1, . . . , xn) := (e1, . . . , en) is introduced to ensure co-
herence between the value of a label variable and the level of the value assigned
to the corresponding variable. For all other common commands, the semantics
of the target language is the same as in the source language.
4.3 Instrumentation as a type system
Our instrumentation algorithm is speciﬁed as a type system in Fig. 2. Its pri-
(S-Chan)
levelOfChan(nch) = `
Γ ` nch : (int` chan)L
(S-Int)
Γ ` n : intL
(S-Var)
Γ (x) = τ
Γ ` x : τ
(S-read)
Γ ` c : int`chan`c
Γ ` read c : int`unionsq`c
(S-Op)
Γ ` e1 : int`1 Γ ` e2 : int`2
Γ ` e1 op e2 : int`1unionsq`2
(S-Skip)
Γ, pc, hc ` skip : T, hc, Γ, skip
(S-Assign)
Γ ` e : σ`e
Γ, pc, hc ` x := e : T, hc, Γ [x 7→ σpcunionsq`e ], genassign
(S-Send)
Γ (x) = int`x Γ (c) = (int` chan)`c
(pc unionsq hc unionsq `x unionsq `c) vm `
Γ, pc, hc ` send x to c : T, hc unionsq `c, Γ, gensend
(S-If)
Γ ` e : int`e h3 = unionsqj∈{1,2}d(Γ, pc unionsq `e, cmd j)
⊥ /∈ ran(Γ1 unionsq Γ2) h = (h1 unionsq h2 unionsq h3 unionsq level(t1 ⊕`e t2))
Γ, pc unionsq `e, hc ` cmd j : tj , hj , Γj , [[cmd j ]] j ∈ {1, 2}
Γ, pc, hc ` if e then cmd1 else cmd2 end : (t1 ⊕`e t2), h, Γ1 unionsq Γ2, genif
(S-Loop)
O(e, cmd , Γ unionsq Γ ′) = to h = d(Γ, pc unionsq `e, cmd)
`t = level(t) `o = level(to) ⊥ /∈ ran(Γ unionsq Γ ′) Γ unionsq Γ ′ ` e : int`e
Γ unionsq Γ ′, (pc unionsq `e), (hc unionsq `t unionsq h′) ` cmd : t, h′, Γ ′, [[cmd ]]
Γ, pc, hc ` while e do cmd end : to, h unionsq h′ unionsq `o, Γ unionsq Γ ′, genwhile
(S-Seq1)
Γ, pc, hc ` cmd1 : D,h, Γ1, [[cmd1]]
Γ, pc, hc ` cmd1; cmd2 : D,h, Γ1, [[cmd1]]
(S-Seq2)
t1 6= D Γ, pc, hc ` cmd1 : t1, h1, Γ1, [[cmd1]]
Γ1, pc, h1 ` cmd2 : t2, h2, Γ2, [[cmd2]]
Γ, pc, hc ` cmd1; cmd2 : t1 o9 t2, h2, Γ2, [[cmd1]]; [[cmd2]]
Fig. 2: Instrumentation and typing rules for the source language
mary goal is to inline monitor actions in the program under analysis, thereby
generating a safe version of it. Its secondary goal is to reject programs that con-
tain obvious leaks of information. The inlined actions are essentially updates and
checks of level variables to prevent a send command from leaking information.
The typing rules of variables and constants have judgements of the form
Γ ` e : σ`, telling that σ` is the variable type of e. The instrumentation judge-
ments are of the form Γ, pc, hc ` cmd : t, h, Γ ′, [[cmd ]] where Γ, Γ ′ : VunionmultiC → VarT
are typing environments (initially empty), cmd is the command under analysis,
pc is the program context, hc is the halting context, t is the termination type
of cmd , h is the updated halting context, and [[cmd ]] is the instrumented com-
mand. The latter is often presented using a macro whose name starts with gen.
The program context, pc, is used to keep track of the security level in which a
command is executed, in order to detect implicit ﬂows. The halting context, hc,
is used to detect progress channels leaks. It represents the level of information
that could cause the program to halt (due to a failed guarded send command)
or diverge (due to an inﬁnite loop). In other words, it is the level of information
that could be leaked through progress channels by an output. The termination t
of a command is propagated in order to keep the halting context up to date. We
distinguish ﬁve termination types T = {T,D,ML,MU ,MH}, where T means
that a command terminates for all memories, D, diverges for all memories, ML,
MH andMU mean that a command's termination is unknown statically; the sub-
script is used to indicate on which level the termination depends. For example,
the termination of the loop in Listing 1.2 is MH because it can either terminate
or diverge at runtime, and this depends on information of level H. The loop
in Listing 1.3 on the other hand is of termination type T because, no matter
what the value of highValue is, it will always eventually terminate. Similarly, a
loop whose condition is always true will have termination type D since it always
diverges. The precision of this analysis depends on the oracle precision.
The instrumentation of a program p begins by inserting commands to ini-
tialize a few level variables: _pc, _hc are initialized to L, as well as the level
variables xlev and xch for each variable x ∈ V appearing in p. Similarly, level
variables clev and cch associated with each channel c used in p are also initial-
ized, but the latter rather gets initialized to levelOfChan(c). After initialization,
instrumentation is given by the rules of Fig. 2. We now explain these rules.
Rules (S-Chan) and (S-Int) specify the channels type and integer constants.
Rule (S-Var) encodes the typing of a variable, as given by environment Γ . Rule
(S-Op) encodes expression typing and excludes channel operations. Rule (S-
Read) speciﬁes the current c value type. To prevent implicit ﬂows, the speciﬁed
security level takes into account the assignment context of channel variable c,
hence the supremum ` unionsq `c. Rule (S-Assign) speciﬁes the type of x from the
one of e to prevent explicit ﬂows, and from pc, to prevent implicit ﬂows. Its
instrumentation is given by the following macro:
genassign =
{
(x, xlev) := (e,_pc unionsq elev) if σ = int
(x, xlev, xch) := (e,_pc unionsq elev, ech) if σ = int`′chan
The variable elev represents the level of expression e, as speciﬁed by Rule (S-
Op). For example if e = x + read c, then elev = xlev unionsq cch unionsq clev. If e = x + y
then elev = xlev unionsq ylev. Rule (S-Send) requires (pc unionsq hc unionsq `x unionsq `c) vm `. The
four variables on the left-hand side correspond to the information level possibly
revealed by the output to x2. The instrumentation translates it as follows
gensend = i f _pc unionsq _hc unionsq xlev unionsq clev v cch
then (send x to c) else f a i l end;
_hc := _hc unionsq clev;
The halting context records the possible failure of the guarded send, it is
updated with the assignment context of the channel. The following example
illustrates why this is necessary.
i f unknownValue > 0 (*H at runtime *)
then c := lowChannel
else c := highChannel end;
send highValue to c;
send lowValue to lowChannel
Listing 1.4: Dangerous runtime halting
Assume that unknownValue is private and false at runtime. Then the ﬁrst
guarded send is accepted, but allowing an output on a low security channel
subsequently would leak information about unknownValue. Updating _hc will
aﬀect the check of all subsequent guarded send. Updating _hc with xlev or _pc is
not necessary since their value will be the same for all low-equivalent memories.
For the conditional rules, we need a union of environments that maps to each
variable appearing in both branches the supremum of the two variable types, and
for each channel variable appearing in both branches the security level U if the
levels of their content diﬀer.
Deﬁnition 3. The supremum of two environments is given as dom(Γ1 unionsq Γ2) =
dom(Γ1) ∪ dom(Γ2), and
(Γ1 unionsq Γ2)(x)=

Γi(x) if x∈dom(Γi)\dom(Γj), {i,j}={1,2} ∨ Γ1(x)=Γ2(x)
(intUchan)`2unionsq`′2 if Γ1(x) = (int`1 chan)`2∧Γ2(x) = (int`′1 chan)`′2 ∧ `1 6= `
′
1
σ`unionsq`′ if Γ1(x) = σ` ∧ Γ2(x) = σ`′
⊥ otherwise.
The symbol ⊥ is used to indicate that a typing inconsistency occured, e.g. when
a variable is used as an integer in one branch and as a channel in another.
The function level : T → L returns the termination level (i.e., the level that
termination depends on) and is deﬁned as:
level(t) =
{
L if t ∈ T,D
` if t =M`
Two operators are used to compose terminations types, ⊕, used in the typing of
conditionals, and o9, used in the typing of sequences. They are deﬁned as follows.
t1 ⊕` t2 =

t1 if t1 = t2 ∧ [t1 6= ML ∨ ` = L]
ML if ` = L ∧ t1 6= t2 ∧ {t1, t2} ⊆ {T,D,ML}
MH if ` = H ∧ [M`′ ∈ {t1, t2}, `′ ∈ L or {t1, t2} = {T,D}]
M〈`unionsq`1unionsq`2〉 otherwise, t1 =M〈`1〉, t2 =M〈`2〉
where 〈e〉 is e, a level expression, without evaluation. We will evaluate 〈e〉 to U
in the instrumentation type system (Fig. 2). We prefer to write 〈e〉 to emphasise
the fact that U is the approximation of an expression.
t1 o9 t2 =

M`1unionsq`2 if t1 = M`1 and t2 = M`2
ti if tj = T, {i, j} = {1, 2}
D otherwise
The following example shows one more requirement. If in Listing 1.5 variable
unknownChannel is a public channel at runtime, and if the last send command
is reached and executed, it would leak information about highValue. The same
leak would happen if instead of the guarded send we had a diverging loop.
i f highValue > 0 then
i f ` v `′
then (send highValue to unknownChannel)
else f a i l end;
end;
send lowValue to lowChannel
Listing 1.5: A guarded send can generate a progress leak
The following function d : ((V unionmulti C → VarT )×L×Cmd)→ L, is used to update
the halting context, where Cmd is the set of commands. It approximates the
information level that could be leaked through progress channels by a possibly
failed guarded send in an unexecuted branch. Here, if Γ (c) = (int` chan)`′ , then
we write Γch(c) = ` and Γlev(c) = `
′.
d(Γ,pc, cmd) =
{
pc u ( unionsq
c∈dc
(Γch(c) unionsq Γlev(c))) if dc ∩mv = ∅
pc otherwise
In this deﬁnition, dc represents the set of dangerous channels, that is, the ones
appearing in at least one guarded send in [[cmd ]]; mv is the set of variables that
may be modiﬁed in cmd . Intuitively, if all the dangerous channels are of level
H and not modiﬁed inside cmd , then we know that these guarded send cannot
fail. If we cannot be sure of their level, then the halting context is updated with
level pc. The supremum over the security levels of channels is taken in case the
value of the channels is sensible (for example if lowValue was H in Listing 1.1).
(S-If) Its instrumentation is given by the following macro:
genif= _oldpcν := _pc;
i f e
then insIF (1,2)
else insIF (2,1)
end;
_pc := _oldpc
where insIF(i,other)= _pc := _pc unionsq elev;
hd(_hifν ,mvother, dcother);
[[cmd i]];
_hc := _hc unionsq _hif;
uphc(t1, t2, elev);
update(mvother)
where dcj represents the set of channels appearing in at least one guardedSend
in [[cmd j ]], mvj is the set of variables that may be modiﬁed in cmd j , tj is the
termination type of cmd j , elev is the guard condition's level expression and `e is
the level of this guard (as computed by the typing system).
The instrumented code starts by saving the current context to _oldpcν (the
symbol ν indicates that it is a fresh variable). The program context is updated
with the security level of the guard condition. The if itself is then generated.
In each branch, function hd, function d's at runtime, evaluates the information
level possibly revealed by a failed guarded send in the other branch.
hd(_h,mv, dc) =
{
_h := (_pc u ( unionsq
c∈dc
cch unionsq clev)) if dc∩mv=∅
_h := _pc otherwise
This must be computed before executing [[cmdj ]] because we want to evaluate
whether the untaken branch could halt the execution or not. This must be done
before [[cmdj ]] as the latter could modify the level of the dangerous channels.
Function uphc is used to generate the code updating the halting context.
uphc(t1, t2, elev) =
{
skip if t1 = t2 ∈ {T,D}
_hc :=_hc unionsq elev otherwise
The rational underlying uphc use is to protect the guard value from being re-
vealed. If we know that both branches behave similarly, then the adversary will
not be able to deduce private information. On the other hand, if the two branches
may not behave the same way, then we have to perform _hc := _hc unionsq elev.
The following function updates the level variables of the untaken branch's
modiﬁed variables so that they have similar types in all low-equivalent memories.
update(mv) =
{
skip if mv = ∅
(x, xlev) := (x, xlev unionsq_pc); update(mv\{x}) if x ∈ mv.
In a situation like the following listing, this function permits to update x's level, to
protect unknownValue.
x := 0;
i f unknownValue (*H at runtime*)
then x := 1 else skip end;
send x to lowChannel
Listing 1.6: Example illustrating why it is necessary to update the modiﬁed variables
(S-Loop) Typing the while involves a ﬁxed point computation due to the ﬂow
sensitivity. It is easy to show that this computation converges. The typing relies on O,
a statically called oracle computing the termination loop type (to).
genwhile= _oldpcν := _pc;
iWhile;
while e do
[[cmd ]]
iWhile; end;
_pc := _oldpc
where iWhile= _pc := _pc unionsq elev;
update(mv);
hd(_hwhileν ,mv, dc);
_hc := _hc unionsq _hwhile;
uphc(to, to, elev);
The inserted commands are similar to those of the if . The level variables and halting
context are updated before the loop in case an execution does not enter the loop. They
must be updated at the end of each iteration for the next iteration.
(S-Seq1) is applied if cmd1 always diverges; we then ignore cmd2, as it will never
be executed. Otherwise, (S-Seq2) is applied. The halting context returned is h2 instead
of h1 unionsq h2 because h2 already takes into account h1.
In a longer version, we present a type system for the target language. We show that
a well typed program satisﬁes the progress-sensitive non-interference property 1, and
that a program generated by our typing system is well typed.
5 Related Work
There has been much research in language-based techniques for controlling information
ﬂow over the last two decades.
Le Guernic et al. [8] present the ﬁrst hybrid information-ﬂow control monitor. The
enforcement is based on a monitor that is able to perform static checks during the
execution. The enforcement is not ﬂow-sensitive but it takes into account concurrency.
In Russo and Sabelfeld [11], the authors state that purely dynamic enforcements are
more permissive than purely static enforcements but they cannot be used in case of
ﬂow-sensitivity. They propose a hybrid ﬂow-sensitive enforcement based on calling
static analysis during the execution. This enforcement is not progress sensitive.
Moore et al. [9] consider precise enforcement of ﬂow-insensitive progress-sensitive
security. Progress sensitivity is also based on an oracle's analysis, but they call upon it
dynamically while we do it statically. We have also introduced additional termination
types to increase the permissiveness of the monitor.
Chudnov and Naumann [5] inline a ﬂow-sensitive progress-insensitive hybrid mon-
itor and prove soundness by bisimulation. We inline a ﬂow-sensitive progress-sensitive
hybrid monitor, and we prove soundness using a mostly-standard security-type system
for the target language.
Askarov and Sabelfeld [3] use hybrid monitors to enforce information security in
dynamic languages based on on-the-ﬂy static analysis. They provide a model to deﬁne
non-interference that is suitable to progress-sensitivity and they quantify information
leaks due to termination [2].
Askarov et al. [1] introduce a progress-sensitive hybrid monitoring framework where
the focus is on concurrent programs, and the use of rely-guarantee reasoning to enable
ﬁne-grained sharing of variables between threads. Each thread is guarded by its own
local monitor (progress- and ﬂow-sensitive). Their local monitor could be replaced by
a variant of our inlined monitor.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a hybrid information ﬂow enforcement mechanism in which the
main contributions are the following.
(a) Our monitor is one of the ﬁrst hybrid monitor that is both ﬂow- and progress-
sensitive. It is more precise and introduces less overhead than currently available solu-
tions (e.g., [10,9]). Since our monitor is inlined, it can be easily optimized using classical
partial evaluation techniques, [7].
(b) We solve a few issues such as (1) the fact that it is not possible to approximate
the level of a channel (by introducing a level U) and (2) the need to approximate the
level of information that could be leaked through progress channels (by introducing a
function d).
We believe our approach to be generalizable to complex lattices, but it will require
a few alterations. Instead of only one uncertain level U , we would use sets of possible
levels (U is, in some sense, an abstraction of the set {L,H}) that are ordered pointwise.
That is, {L} v {L,H} v {H}. The function d would have to be adapted. Namely, the
complement operation in d would have to be replaced with the following expression:
{` : ` 6v Γch(c)} ∩ {` : ` 6A pc}.
Future work includes extensions to concurrency, declassiﬁcation and information
leakage due to timing. We would like to scale up the approach to deal with real world
languages and to test it on elaborate programs.
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